POETIC METAPHOR AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE
With Examples from Eliot, Rilke, Mayakovsky, Mandelshtam, Pound, Creeley, Amichai, and the New York Times*

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Metaphor again? This time, an attempt to observe it as part of the poetic fiction – and fiction in speech – rather than as a mere device of language.

1

Metaphor is a curious case. Perhaps it reflects the current state of poetics in relation to other fields of the humanities. On the one hand, there is an endless cross-disciplinary procession of theoretical books and papers on the subject. One wave peaked in the nineteen fifties and sixties, another has developed in recent years. Important contributions have been made to the clarification of the basic notions of a theory of metaphor. Characteristically, many of the prominent studies have come from disciplines outside of literary criticism such as philosophy, psychology, linguistics, which are usually more oriented toward rational theoretical analysis.

However, many of these theoretical writings are interested primarily in a definition, in explaining what "metaphor" *is*, rather than in developing tools for description and research of actual metaphorical texts. With a phenomenon as omnipresent as metaphor (especially metaphor in poetry), a definition will merely provide a label rather than enhance observation or illuminate the differences between various poets and poems.

Furthermore, it is not at all clear that "metaphor" (or "literature" itself) is a well-defined class *sui generis*, with properties all its own. Analogy, similarity, comparison, interaction, etc., appear in metaphors (perhaps not in all of them) and appear elsewhere too. Arguments about their possible inclusion in a definition of metaphor are less crucial than the question of what forms such relations may take if and whenever they appear.

Secondly, many theories of metaphor are based on simple examples, often domesticated in language (e.g., Max Black's "man is a wolf" or John Searle's "Sally is a block of ice," which, of course, serve their own purposes well). It is not clear that such observations are transferable to more extensive and obscure instances of creative metaphors, either in poetry or in journalism and everyday speech.

In the following pages, I shall try to approach the problem of metaphor from a different angle. Anyone who has dealt with this subject will understand why I have decided to forego a preliminary discussion of existing theories: a careful analysis of the major contributions alone would require a whole book, as has been shown so admirably by Paul Ricoeur.[1] I shall analyze some cases of extended metaphors in Modernist poetry and then observe similar phenomena in non-poetic texts. Rather than isolating the category of metaphor as an independent unit of language, I shall deal with it in the framework of a more general theory of literary texts and text semantics.

2

To begin, we must eliminate a number of preconceived notions which are still implicit in various definitions of metaphor. Metaphor cannot be limited to:

- *one word*, which has changed its meaning or a *name* transferred to a foreign object;
- the boundaries of a *sentence*, which has a metaphorical "focus" within a "frame" (in Max Black's terms);
- a *discrete*, static, prefabricated *"unit"* with limited boundaries, like a morpheme or a word;
- the level of *"language"* or "meaning units" as separate from the level of "represented objects" and the "World" of a poem (in the sense of Ingarden's separate strata).

As we shall see in the following examples, metaphors may be any of these but are not exclusively so. If a metaphor is a two-term

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* The study underlying this paper was conducted at the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, where I spent a fruitful year in 1981–1982. I presented the paper to attentive audiences at the Universities of Yale, Harvard, and North Carolina and at the Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics and have benefitted from their comments and criticism.

[1] Though I shall not discuss other theories of metaphor here, many of the writings in the field are in the background of this paper. In 1964, at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, I edited an in-house anthology of major theories of metaphor, which is quite similar in scope to the studies surveyed in Ricoeur's book.

relation, any of its terms may cover much more than a word in a text. It is often an open-ended relation rather than a fixed unit. A whole sentence may be literal when read independently and become metaphorical in its wider context. A metaphor in poetry may begin with a connotation of a word and grow into a central object in the fictional situation of a poem; i.e., it may hover between the "style" and the "World" of a poem.

The point is that metaphor is not a linguistic unit but a text-semantic pattern, and semantic patterns in texts cannot be identified with units of syntax (as I have argued elsewhere, 1982a, 1982b). Isolating metaphor as a linguistic unit would mean separating the processing of language from a reader's processing of texts, including the construction of fictional (or "intentional") characters, settings and "worlds," as projected in works of literature. It would also mean isolating the theory of metaphor from the problems of contemporary theories of literary texts, their interpretations, constructions, and deconstructions.

In short, we must observe metaphors in literature not as static, discrete units, but as dynamic patterns, changing in the text continuum, context-sensitive, relating to specific (fictional or real) frames of reference and dependent on interpretations. The study of metaphor is thus lifted out of Stylistics or Rhetoric and located in the study of what I would propose to call "Integrational Semantics"[2] (which occupies part of the traditional broad field of "Pragmatics").

3

Let us first observe a rather simple example. In his book, *A Study of Metaphor*, J. J. A. Mooij quotes a passage from W. H. Auden's poem on the Portuguese colony "Macao":

(16) A weed from Catholic Europe, it *took root*
Between the yellow mountains and the sea,
And *bore* these gay stone houses like a fruit,
And *grew* on China imperceptibly.

The scholar underlines his metaphors and observes:

> As to (16), the metaphorical character of "weed" and "took root" is considerably clearer than that of "grew on" – therefore it was not without some hesitation that I italicized "grew on" (Mooij 1976:2, 6).

This hesitation can be cleared up if we approach metaphor from a different perspective. A metaphor exists only if two domains exist

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[2] For an outline of my ideas on "Integrational Semantics: An Understander's Theory of Meaning in Context, see Hrushovski (1982a) (although in that version, some of the symbols have been changed). For a corrected version, see Hrushovski (1982b).

vividly in a text; the metaphorical expressions belong literally to one and metaphorically to the other. The words "bore" and "grew on" may not be metaphors at all, as so many "dead metaphors" codified in language. They are rather semes of polysemic words, which have one seme for the designation of a concrete object and another for some abstract relations or psychological state (often considered "metaphorical," e.g., "a gray life" or "a warm person"). However, unlike diachronically metaphorical words (such as "window" originating from the equivalent of "wind's eye"), in which metaphor was merely the process by which a new word was created, "dead metaphors" are still living in the language as dead *metaphors* and can be revived. The reason is that the same words preserve their concrete ("literal") meaning in another context in the same synchronic stage of the language (e.g., "bore a grudge" or "bore a burden" vs. "bore a child" or "bore fruit"). In order to deautomatize the dead metaphor, such a context must be provided.

Indeed, in Auden's poem, two *frames of reference* are established: one is the Catholic city of Macao with its stone houses growing on the side of continental China; the other is a weed, taking root, growing, bearing fruit, etc. The first frame of reference (fr_1) is presented as *existing* in the world of the poem (it is further enriched from what we know about the external world indicated by the real geographical names). The second frame of reference (fr_2), the weed, is introduced as *non-existing* in the fictional world of the poem. It is not even referred to directly, merely provided with scattered semantic material. As such, however, it is presented to the imagination of the reader for the sake of metaphorical transfers. The text exploits the frame of reference of a plant (fr_2) for several possible connotations, moreover: it develops the weed image in additional directions. These include the "fruit" (not essential to a weed) as well as aspects not mentioned directly, such as the continuity of an enormous growth, stubbornly spreading "between the yellow mountains and the sea."

We could filter out the two frames of reference in the language of this text in the following manner:

fr$_2$	*fr*$_1$
A weed . . . took root	A . . . (x) . . . from Catholic Europe, it took root
Between the yellow mountains and the sea,	Between the yellow mountains and the sea,
And bore . . . a fruit	And bore these gay stone houses. . .
And grew . . . imperceptibly.	And grew on China imperceptibly.

without change, in either direction.

In this poem, two independent frames of reference are developed, entering mutual relationships in several forms: an identity metaphor (Macao = "weed"); revived linguistic dead metaphors ("took root," "bore," "grew"); a simile ("like a fruit"). Such relations may involve either a whole *fr* or its parts or aspects; e.g., "a fruit" is related directly only to the houses, though it is open for a metaphorical transfer to the whole colony and its culture.

The juxtaposition of the two *fr*s may serve not only for similarity transfers but for any other relations between the thematics and the language representing either. Thus, a "weed" has negative connotations, representing the point of view of China; and it clashes with the positive connotations of "fruit" and the perhaps naïve illusion of "gay" stone houses, representing the internal point of view of Macao. A shift of point of view within what may be called one metaphor (akin to Picasso's wish to see the feminine face from two perspectives) is not uncommon in metaphorical patterns.

Under the circumstances, there should be no hesitation as to the metaphoricity of "grew on." Why should we separate the several language metaphors in this strophe, and how can we disregard their continuity (including the *simile* "like a fruit")? "Grew on" becomes *metaphorical* in relation to Macao precisely because it is related *literally* to the weed, it is part of a concrete image for the reader to visualize. In other words, it is metaphorical for fr_1 because it is literal in fr_2.

As we see here, there is a textual interpretation between fr_1 (Macao) and fr_2 (plant). Not only is fr_1 described in terms of fr_2, but fr_2 is reinforced in the imagination from the description of fr_1: Macao is like a weed, but it is a stranded weed, far from its source and also enormous and vital, like Macao clinging to the shore of China. In other words, we observe a two-way process: the image of the weed is colored by the description (and geography) of Macao and then, in turn, as such, it reinforces the description of the city.

This is precisely the process observed elsewhere (Hrushovski 1980) in sound-meaning interactions: sounds obtain their meaning-tone from some of the co-textual semantics in order then to imbue the text with this tone, reinforce it. E.g., when a critic feels that the sibilants in Shakespeare's sonnet ("When to the sessions of sweet silent thought / I summon up remembrance of things past," etc.) express a "hushing quality," he is transferring a connotation of the meaning in "sweet silent thought" to the sound-pattern, then uses this sound pattern, as colored by such a meaning-tone, to return and suffuse with it the meaning of the whole strophe.



Figure 1

The diagramatic structure is the same (Figure 1).

The interpenetration of the two domains is reinforced by the interchangeability of words: the verbs "took root," "bore," "grew on" – which display a literal-metaphoric tension in their polysemic structure – serve in one lexical capacity in fr_1 and in another in fr_2. As a matter of fact, in this text, "bore" shifts metaphorically from a seme meaning carrying, bearing a burden in the beginning of the line ("and bore these gay stone houses") to a seme implying fruit-bearing, when surprised by the simile "like a fruit" (the first seme cannot be "like" a fruit at all).

4

Since metaphors involve relations of meaning – though their import is not of meaning alone – their understanding must rely on a theory of meaning as established in texts. We cannot be satisfied, for example, with a classification of metaphors by parts of speech.[3] Neither can a theory of metaphor be based on syntax. A sentence is not the actual semantic "frame" to which the metaphorical "focus" relates (as proposed in Max Black's landmark paper, 1962); the alignment of semes on both sides of a metaphor is not necessarily bound to syntactic forms.

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[3] Such a classification was proposed by Brooke-Rose in her *Grammar of Metaphor*, a book full of excellent observations, which does show the relevance of grammatical categories as one important parameter forming metaphor.

Paul Ricoeur has argued for the preservation of two complementary theories of metaphor, using the distinction between "semiotics" and "semantics" as defined by Emile Benveniste, the first based on the word as a sign, the second on the sentence. "The sentence is the unit of discourse," says Benveniste (as quoted by Ricoeur 1977:68). I would suggest that there is another unit of discourse, too: *the frame of reference* (*fr*), providing the base for a third, complementary and encompassing, theory of metaphor. Though not recognized by linguists (because it has no grammatically formalized properties), no text coherence can be understood without it.

Both the sentence and the *fr* combine words in a text; but the *fr* goes off, as it were, on a tangent: it selects some parts of a sentence and adds them to (parts of) other sentences, using "reality-like" models. A sentence is a linear unit occupying a stretch of the text; whereas an *fr* is a construct based on discontinuous elements in a text, which are linked to each other by some kind of a flexible but necessary "semantic syntax."

According to Benveniste, "propositions can be set one after the other in a consecutive relationship, but they cannot be integrated in a higher level," as phonemes or morphemes are. For this reason, though containing signs, a sentence is not a sign (since a sign requires such a hierarchical relation) (see Ricoeur 1977:68). A sentence, we may add, is the first, linear level of linking signs into a text and, as such, is indispensable for text formation. A string of sentences forms a text. But text formation is not equivalent with text integration.

Frames of reference, on the other hand, can be integrated on a higher level: in higher *frs* and, ultimately, in a Field of Reference (*FR*) (which, in turn, can be integrated in the "World" and serve so-called "symbolic" or "modelling," i.e., "sign," functions). Granted, both *fr* and *FR* are flexible units, they allow for a free play of constructs (within the limits provided by the text), whereas sentences have fixed forms; for that, however, the former preserve sign characteristics.

The network of *frs* presents what the text is *about*. They provide the bridge between words of a natural language and the representation of the ever-changing "World." They serve, too, for the transition from the lower, formalized levels of language to the open, individually contextualized, thematic bodies of communication. By means of *frs*, we speak with "world-experience" rather than with codified words of a limited language; we send the reader to an ever-changing,

open *Network of Information* and manipulate his knowledge of it, rather than convey all we want to say merely by the words used.

Therefore, a theory of metaphor would benefit from being based on frames of reference as the real units of a semantically integrated text. Within this framework, we may preserve whatever contributions to metaphor are made on the lower levels: syntactic deviance, morphological tropes, sound patterns, neologisms, etc.; all may *signal* a metaphor or provide it with additional formal parameters, provided they are accepted by the decisive, semantic factor.

Before attending to concrete analyses of poetic metaphors, I shall characterize in Chapter 5 the general traits of the main concept I use to describe them: "frames of reference."

5

The basic unit of semantic integration is not a sentence but a *frame of reference* (*fr*). An *fr* is any continuum of two or more referents def.
to which parts of a text or its interpretations may relate: either referring directly or simply mentioning, implying, or evoking. It may indicate an object, a scene, a situation, a person, a state of affairs, a mental state, a history, a theory; it may be real, hypothetical, or fictional. It may be given in reality or in the reader's network of knowledge, or projected uniquely in a given text. Its ontological status is immaterial to semantics: it is anything we can talk about, no matter whether and how it exists.[4]

We may use any object that we know about (from direct experience or mediated via models, pictures, or texts) as a frame of reference: a pillow, a house, a city, a philosophy, a love story, the state of the economy, the haze in autumn trees. We may also refer to *frs* which we cannot observe directly. We may distinguish between a *present* and an *absent fr*, not directly present in the speech situation; a *known* or an *unknown fr*, of which the hearer may have no previous knowledge; an *existing* or *fictional* (imaginary) *fr*, invented by the speaker.

The amount of information about an *fr* given in a text or available outside of the text may be detailed or partial or spotty: it is not a complete object, merely a frame of reference to which we can refer, in which we can indicate specific referents. Thus, material objects or scenes in fiction, as well as characters, ideas, or experiences, do not have to be defined or presented in full in a text; they may simply be named, referred to, hinted at, or evoked through some of their details. Their existence in the "real" world or in the "world" of a poem or a novel may not be certain at all, their details or forms questionable, depending: a) on possible knowledge about them from outside of the given text; b) on the speakers and positions ("Points of View") through which information about the *fr* was presented in the text; and c) on readers' temporary or conclusive, changing or recurring semantic constructs ("readings" and "interpretations").

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[4] This theory, though developed independently, is clearly similar to theories describing fiction in terms of "possible worlds." I prefer the concepts of "frame of reference" (*fr*) and "Field of Reference" (*FR*) because they do not imply any stability of rules in a possible world (or, alternatively, constant changes of alternate states of such worlds); two characters may tell different and contradictory things about the same *fr* without changing the "possible world."

Semantic elements in discourse are linked to each other by means of syntax as well as by various devices described in theories of discourse. One of these is *"coreferentiality,"* linking two discontinuous words by means of a common referent. The concept of *fr* widens this relation: *co-relatedness in one fr (co-fr)* is a major tool for integrating discourse. If one sentence has a door opened and the next talks about clothing "strewn about," they are linked by a hypothetical *fr* – "room" – as much as if they were linked by syntax.[5] When an *fr* is established – in a text or in an interpretation – semantic elements relating to it will be brought together, integrated with each other. For example, a Freudian hypothesis on a character's (or his author's) Oedipus complex, even if never mentioned in the text, will select and relate such elements of the text which may support this hypothesis.

Such an integration may fill in complementary details, create mutually specified and individualized properties, or – on the contrary – create tensions and contradictions between mutually exclusive positions. This integration works on all levels. For example, when one sentence has "new red houses" and another, later sentence has "bright brick houses," the redness becomes redness of bricks, the brightness brightness of red bricks, and the houses become "red-brick housing," a social concept much wider than the separate adjectives may suggest (see my analysis of Joyce's "Eveline" in Hrushovski 1982a, 1982b).

Within any possible *fr* there must be indeterminacies (Ingarden), spots not specified in the text, many of which remain indeterminate: no piece of "reality" can be represented in language in all its detail. Only some of those indeterminacies become *gaps* – provoked by the structure of the text or the demands of a reading – to be filled in by the reader. Naturally, such gap-filling encourages reconsideration or enables the formulation of several competing solutions as the text unfolds or as reading history develops.[6]

An actual reading does not usually exhaust the establishment of all possible relationships in a text or the integration of all elements which may be brought together in one *fr*. Actual readings are selections from, or approximations in various degrees to, a fully integrated meaning-complex of a text. Readers may be encouraged in their semantic integration by various devices of the text or by traditions of reading and genre or by the nature of a referred-to known *fr* or by the need to explain or to justify intuitions (e.g., in a written interpretation). An important guide is the global semantic organization of a text.

frs are built of two strains: they are modeled upon *typical* "frames" external to the text (e.g., a room, a hospital, paranoia) and simultaneously *individualized*, provided with atypical referents, specific to a given *fr* (including proper names). Any subsequent material related to an established *fr* must be constrained by the individual features (and, in turn, constrain or revise them).

The boundaries of *frs* are not fixed, they depend on any possible way of organizing the "World" of comprehension. Two continuous *frs* (e.g., a person and a street) may merge into one or be separated for separate attention. *frs*, or information obtaining in them, may be constructed and deconstructed as a reading unfolds, or in consecutive readings.

An *fr* is not identical with a segment of a text. True, a segment may often be *constituted* by one *fr* (a description of a room, historiosophical considerations, a portrait of a character, etc.). But the same *fr* may receive additional material in other segments or outside the text. Thus, a passage describing a character or an event may be supplemented or contradicted in later passages of the text. Or a newspaper passage referring to a blast in Beirut may be supplemented, modified, or contradicted by previous, later, or outside information. On the other hand, in any segment of a text constituted by one *fr*, there is also material for the potential construction of other, intersecting *frs*. E.g., a description of a party includes not only topics of discourse, but also people each of whom may become an *fr* in his or her own right, subsequently unfolded in other parts of the text. The theory of "motifs" as the smallest thematic segments of a text (and Barthes's structuralist "functions" and "indices") collapsed and confused the two.

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[5] Here, and below, I refer briefly to examples analyzed in Hrushovski (1982a, 1982b).

[6] These concepts, developed from Ingarden, may be familiar to the Western reader from the work of Wolfgang Iser. The theory of gap-filling (as distinct from "indeterminacies") was independently developed in Israel, in the so-called Tel Aviv School of Poetics, in the early 1960s by Menakhem Perry, Joseph Haephrati, Meir Sternberg, and myself. In the studies of that school, there was no naïve objectivism or single-meaning view of works of literature. On the contrary, many views of Deconstructionism were foreshadowed in studies showing multiple and contradictory gap-filling (notably in Perry and Sternberg 1968) as well as "Inverted Poems," where the continuation of a poem subverts what seems to be its initial message (as in an early study by Perry and Haephrati 1963).

A number of *frs* are related to each other in a larger whole: a *Field of Reference* (*FR*), a hypothetical, discontinuous universe (such as the USA, World War II, Philosophy). A literary text creates an *Internal Field of Reference* (*IFR*), containing a set of referents exclusive to this text (the so-called "fictional world" of the novel), though it may at the same time refer to *External FRs* as well.[7]

To sum up, *frs* are not necessarily full-fledged "represented objects" (Ingarden's "Gegenständlichkeiten") but frames that the text, its voices, or its readers may relate to. They are not stable. Their ontology is irrelevant to their textual (and experiential) existence. Using this concept for the description of metaphors, we are not bound by the stability of "objects" or their "associated commonplaces" (Black), but rather depend on the individual features of a specific *fr* and its possible gap-filling. Moreover, we do not limit metaphor to relations between real objects, but use the same terminology if one (or both) term(s) of the metaphor is (are) a state of affairs, an abstract concept ("love"), a mood, a religion, an idea.

Here, however, one must stress the crucial role played by the textual mediation of frames of reference. Since *frs* are presented to us in a text not as discrete objects but as patterns of language, usually linking a number of elements (words or sentences or subpatterns), each of those elements, or any combination of them, can have autonomous relations of their own to their immediate or wider context, within this *fr* or outside it. Therefore there may be simultaneously a global relation between two *frs* (two characters or two terms of a metaphor) as well as local relations between their parts, and also any other kind of patterning: of stylistic, semantic, syntactic, morphological, or sound aspects of the language used. Such relations may include metaphorical transfers as well as other kinds of semantic and non-semantic interactions. And they may include a "dynamic" aspect, employing the sequential nature of a text for the sake of changing relations (and changing the reader's experience), in metaphor as in any other respect.

6

T. S. Eliot opened his first collection of poems with an "image" (as the New Critics called it) that was still sufficiently shocking in 1939 for Cleanth Brooks to include it in his defense of Modernist poetry

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[7] For a more detailed discussion see Hrushovski (1976, 1979) and especially my forthcoming paper on "Fictionality, Reference and Re-Presentation," based on a Harvard symposium lecture and the international Synopsis IV conference at Tel Aviv, May 1982.

("Metaphor and the Tradition," cf. Brooks 1965). Indeed, it became a marker of "Modernism" for the whole poem, though most of its language was not as strikingly Modernist at all.

> Let us go then, you and I,
> When the evening is spread out against the sky
> Like a patient etherised upon a table;
> (The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock)

As often in Modernist poetry, we have here – syntactically and rhetorically – a *simile*, rather than a formal metaphor. The simile links the basic situation of the poem (fr_1) with the "image" of a patient (fr_2). The simile, however, is – as often in Modernist poetry – a mere excuse, a patterning device, linking the two objects through one common property: the *tertium comparationis* of "spread out." As any interpretation will show, the trait of being spread out is in itself neither central to the meaning of the poem nor important for the perception of the evening or the speaker. There is, however, in the compared clause, *redundant information*. A man lying on the floor would be enough to illustrate the idea of being "spread out"; the additional specifications ("patient" rather than man, "etherised" rather than lying, "upon a table" rather than floor) require naturalization, or functional integration in the basic situation of the poem.

Since the compared scene is *denied existence* in the fictional situation of the poem, it can only be integrated through *metaphorical transfers*. Thus, from the point of view of a reader-oriented text theory, or of Integrational Semantics, it is structurally a metaphor indeed; more precisely: a relation with a *metaphorical function*. Instead of metaphor being a channel for similarity relationships, here the simile becomes a channel for metaphorical transfers.

The metaphorical transfers, however, do not simply metaphorize individual words: it would be stretching the meaning of the poem to see the evening as someone's patient or to identify in the realistic city scene the equivalents of "ether" or "table." We are encouraged to construct a hypothetical scene (fr_2) of a patient in a hospital waiting for an operation, and see this whole scene in a metaphorical relation to the basic frame of reference of the co-text or the BASE.

Here a terminological remark is due. I suggest abandoning Richards's pair of terms, "vehicle" and "tenor," because it implies a limitation of metaphor to a one-directional substitution theory. It seems to assume that the "vehicle" stands for some "tenor" and that the "tenor" is absent from the text. This may be true for "A *weed* from Catholic Europe" in the Auden poem. In other cases, however, both domains (*frs*) may be present in the text. Black's alternative pair, "focus" and "frame," is formulated in syntactic terms, limited to a sentence. In my view, any metaphor, whether presented formally as such or not, requires a metaphorical *transfer* from one *fr* to another. The *fr* to which the transfer is made may be called *BASE*, and the other one a *secondary fr*. We may still keep Black's term, "frame," for that specific part of the BASE to which a part of the secondary *fr*, as a "focus," is related.

As we shall see later, it is not always clear which is the BASE and which is the secondary *fr* in a poem; it is, however, always clear for a particular metaphorical transfer: semantic material from one ("secondary") *fr* must be naturalized in another (its BASE), "translated" into its language; whereupon the relations may be reversed and the BASE may become a *secondary fr* to its counterpart or to yet another *fr*. I would like to keep the term BASE for the sake of a specific metaphor, as distinguished from the "basic *fr*" of a poem, or of its part (if there is one).

To return to our example: the word "hospital" does not appear in the text, it is merely the best hypothetical frame of reference which would make sense of all words in line 3 and specify (or "disambiguate") them. Thus the "table" becomes an operating table (the only seme of this polysemic word that makes sense with "ether"); the neologism, "etherised" for "anesthetized," makes the smell concrete, refreshes the whole scene, and adds to the shock value. Thus, just three words map a new *fr* and open a store of information (hospital, operation) available for metaphorical transfer. When we claim that the evening (and further, its metonymies: the city, and the person speaking) attains such qualities as: helpless, passive, semi-conscious, hovering between life and death (of the day? of the person? of his certainties? of love?), we transfer properties of *gaps* in fr_2 ("hospital") not given directly in words of the text.

Thus the metaphor does not simply activate connotations of given words, but also *gaps* in a constructed *fr*. In other words, the evening is compared to "what it feels like" to be a patient etherised upon a table. (As we shall see later, it is not the evening itself, but "what it feels like" to be in such an evening, that is compared to what it feels like to be etherised upon a table; and the first "what it feels like" is further influenced by who it is that feels, as most interpreters queried, which can be reconstructed only from the poem as a whole, perhaps with additional clues from the outside, from T. S. Eliot's attitudes, writings, biography, or the ideas and attitudes of the period.)

Therefore, one cannot really speak about precise and specific, discrete meanings that are transferred in this metaphor; the hesitant language of our interpretation, as of most interpretations of the poem, depends on this need to circumscribe a situation or, better, to name the mutual filtering and mutual fermenting of two unrelated situations. This vagueness or freedom and imprecision in the language of interpretations, accompanied by a profusion of words and circumscriptions (though often suggested in a tentative manner), is due to the fact that they interpret not words but readers' reconstructed though diffuse empathies with situations (*frs*).

It is one of the praised qualities of poetry that it creates something unavailable in, and irreducible to, codified language (a poem is like a new "word," revealing an insight which has no name in natural language, as Heidegger described it). Furthermore, something radically undecidable, where all solutions are guesses which have to be suggested and taken back at the same time because they were not really expressed "in so many words" and because contradictory solutions hover simultaneously and contribute to the rich, seemingly inexhaustible quality of poetic fiction. This imprecise, inexhaustible, demanding quality of unresolved poetic tensions has a powerful impact on the trained reader, quite unlike direct statements or explicit lexical (or transferred) meanings. What is certain here is not the solution to a relationship but the relationship itself between several frames of reference (as open constructs, to be filled from our world-experience); the material presented to the reader's imagination; as well as the possibilities for several specific, though undecided, solutions.

The secondary *fr* of a metaphor, denied existence in the Field of Reference of the poem, does not state a belief but sets the reader's imagination in a new situation, breaking the continuity of a plausible representation and forcing on him some kind of accommodation between the two, either in metaphoric transfers and semantic resolutions or, at least, in the tension perceived.

Metaphor is one of various modes of speaking about the world not by means of natural language but by using the language of the "World," using fragments of world-experience to convey other experiences. In metaphor, words send the reader to recover such world-cognitions in order to turn them into "world-language" (e.g., the "language" of an operating room – used for the perception of a city scene); it is a language unlimited in scope, full of potential actualizations and rich in reverberations, because it is speaking with *situations* not with concepts, with "world-knowledge" rather than with ready-made signs.

Metaphors are also "concrete universals," in that they present concrete, usually sensuous elements which represent something beyond them. This presentation is extremely abbreviated: no direct description of a hospital scene would be acceptable in three words. *Abbreviation* works in metaphor as it does in flashes of recollection or stream of consciousness – all are forms of secondary *frs*. Furthermore, metaphors are one form of *diverted concreteness*: instead of giving the reader concrete details of what it means to feel in an evening like that, the poem strikes the reader with concrete, sensuous details in a secondary domain. Their concreteness is effective, has sharper impact on the reader, precisely because these details are taken out of a continuous, plausible, reality-like context and are not automatized as details of a continuous description may be.

In a standard hospital scene, there are many aspects irrelevant to a possible transfer to the city evening (doctors, nurses, the corridors, white sheets, surgical instruments). Thus it is the basic fr_1 which activates or encourages certain gap-fillings in fr_2, even those that we would not have thought of when first mentioning a hospital scene, and excludes or suppresses others. Such activated gap-fillings (or connotations of a scene) become non-verbal metaphors for fr_1, made explicit in various interpretations. It is, again, a two-way interaction of the type discussed above: the basic scene influences our reading of the secondary situation, which, in turn, illuminates the first. This interdependence of two open *frs* activates the reader's sensibilities and the interpreters' dialectical negotiating.

Naturally, the metaphorical transfer described here works only in a certain cultural tradition of "close reading" of poetry which assumes that all elements in a text, as well as the order of all elements, are *functional* to its meaning, an attitude shared by traditional Bible-exegesis, Hermeneutics, Structuralism, the heritage of New Criticism, and Deconstruction. A less functionalist (or a less semantic) view would merely accept the clash, or the juxtaposition, as rhetorical or poetic effect.

However, even in the framework of such a "maximal meaning" hypothesis, it would be wrong to limit metaphor to its contribution to meaning alone, as some theories seem to suggest. The clash between two *frs* and their respective language elements, and the various effects this may have on readers, is one of the major, non-semantic, functions of metaphor. In our case, the metaphorization itself may have been enhanced by the drastic clash between thematically and historically strange materials, included in the two *frs*. Furthermore, while isolating the simile proper (lines 2–3), only the clash is available; the specifics of transferred meanings are still unclear, their purpose unrevealed. This clash quality rather than the specific semantic transfers – even more so, appearing *before* any such semantic naturalization is possible – is what made the poem famous, striking, and Modernist.

Now, because of the two-way interaction, the semantic unit is not closed in lines 2–3 (though the simile is). Indeed, fr_2 ("hospital") seems to be exhausted in line 3, since it receives no further semantic stuff in the immediate continuation: no additional words qualify the hospital scene. But the BASE of the metaphor, fr_2 – "the evening" – changes its form as the text unfolds. In lines 2–3, it is still much like a Romantic image of the dying day compared to a human situation, as in Wordsworth's image "The holy time is quiet as a Nun/Breathless with adoration" (quoted by Cleanth Brooks for the purpose of contrast), though, as Brooks points out, Modernist poets introduce "the unpleasant and the obscure" (Brooks 1965:3, 4).

Let us observe: the language of the two *frs* is not separated. "Spread out" is language from the secondary *fr* (hospital) which penetrated the first (evening): only metaphorically can an evening be said to be "spread out" like a patient. Furthermore, in order to accept this metaphorical predicate, the evening must become a concrete body occupying only part of visible space (rather than a relational time concept or a quality describing the whole space), which is further underlined by its separation from the sky. Thus, semantic integration requires metaphorization of "spread out" or concretization of the abstract notion "evening" and counter-intuitive limitation of its scope.

Subsequently, this image of the evening as a concrete spatial body, spread out against the sky (i.e., close to earth), encourages the metonymic transfer from the evening to the evening city. Indeed, in the context of the period in which the poem was published, it is easier to relate sickness to the city rather than to the evening *per se*; the city, in turn, easily becomes a metonymy for its inhabitants, for urban society, or even humanity or the "world" as a whole. A metonymic chain is constructed: the "world" is like humanity is like the people in this city is like the evening city is like the evening is like (by metaphor) an etherised patient.

Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, in their influential textbook *Understanding Poetry*, do not hesitate to read the evening metonymically and speak of an "evening world," which "becomes more and more important as the poem proceeds." "It is a world of neither night nor day. Twilight is the atmosphere of the poem" (where, clearly, the atmospheric expressions are meant symbolically). With the image of the patient in line 3, "the twilight world becomes also the world of twilight in another way, the realm between life and death." Here, "the notion of a sick world" enters the poem (Brooks and Warren 1960:391).

The image in lines 2–3 can hardly justify such generalizations (which typically represent contemporary reception of T. S. Eliot's poetry). The interpretation is, rather, based on a reading of the poem as a whole. The point is that, though the second term of the relation was given in full in these lines, the BASE of the metaphor – the first term – is constantly shifting. In lines 2–3, it may still be an evening in nature, in the countryside, in the tradition of Romantic poetry; the following lines make us reunderstand the evening as a metonymy for the evening city (*fr*$_3$):

> Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
> The muttering retreats
> Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
> And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells:

This description of the street scene may reinforce such additional connotations of the hospital scene as: dim light, drugged, smelling, etc. It also evokes new candidates for the sickness image.

Here, however, a fourth *fr* is introduced: the lyrical narrator. It was from his point of view that the evening was seen as an etherised patient. Was it a projection, an externalized emotion? Is he himself like a patient? Does he feel "etherised"? Line 1, though not a part of the "image" proper, and so playfully unpoetic, is crucial for our perception; it presents a stronger candidate for metonymic transfer: the person walking through this evening (*fr*$_4$). This possibility is resumed in the immediate continuation, which presents the city as not only metonymic but also metaphoric to (possibly) his mind:

> Streets that follow like a tedious argument
> Of insidious intent
> To lead you to an overwhelming question...

(The metaphor is again bi-directional: the streets are personified, i.e., like men; hence we are encouraged to see men as being like these streets that are like men. The personification leads to an [inverted] metaphor, as in Romantic nature imagery.)

When Brooks and Warren say that "twilight is the atmosphere of the poem," do they mean the city or the narrator or both? The metaphor of the patient may easily be transferred through the evening to its extensions (metonymies), among them the city and Prufrock. Both are developed and changing throughout the poem and therefore leave the hospital scene, too, open for possible reunderstanding. The question is to what extent "Prufrock's world" (a further metonymic chain) is analogous to the slum scene or is its opposite – both relations can be found in the text. And both, the man and the city, may be read as representing "a world" (in the sense of the ethos of humanity in a certain period, such as "the Modern world"). Interpreters felt that it was a "sick world," thus relating the metaphor further away from its immediate BASE, to generalizations about the poem as a whole or some of its frames of reference (the city, the citizens, the bored women in the drawing room, Prufrock, Humanity).[8]



Figure 2

The chain of linkings which enables such interpretative transfer may be represented schematically as shown in Figure 2. (The chai represents: [2] patient – [1] evening – [3] city – [4] Prufrock [5] the slum inhabitants – [6] the salon women. Lines represen metonymical transfers; m – metaphorical transfer; dots – furthe unfolding.)

The whole poem is a chain of intertwined frames of reference metonymically related to each other, which encourage the establishment of parallels, oppositions, metaphorical transfers, or symboliza tion. The relations are mostly tacit, not clearly related to specifi characters, often contradictory, therefore open to constructions an deconstructions, but constantly enhanced by personified description of nature and leaps from generalizations to concrete details, fro descriptions to reflections, from dialogues to allusions, which mak almost everything seem representative of or opposite to everythin else. Metaphoric transfers are part of this network. The first meta phor looms as an undigested menace over it all.

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[8] To what extent the metaphoric BASE moves, in the eyes of some readers, and e compasses ever wider ranges can be seen from some further quotes from *Understandi Poetry*:

> "After a brief digression (lines 70–74) we return to the drawing room and t etherized, peaceful twilight world in which Prufrock does not have the strength to for the 'crisis,' the overwhelming question."
>
> "Further, much is made [in the end of the poem] of Prufrock's world – it is meaningless world of half-lights and shadows, the world of an ether dream, and it is in another world, the defeated world of the slum."
>
> "[...] he speaks to the you of the poem – the reader – only because he takes t reader to be damned too, to belong to the same world and to share the same disease. It the disease of loss of conviction, of loss of faith in the meaning of life ... so the poe in the end, is not about poor Prufrock. He is merely a symbol for a general dise [...]" (Brooks and Warren 1960:392, 396).

7

The word linking two sides of a simile – the common property or common denominator or similarity feature of the two terms (*tertium comparationis*) – may not be a single property at all but just a verbal connective. Thus when Mayakovsky writes: "the sky is red like the Marseillaise," the link is through the polysemy of the word, "red"; while the sunset sky is red in color, the revolutionary song is red only metaphorically (Figure 3). When "red" is connected to "the sky," the second seme is excluded (crossed out); when it is said of the "Marseillaise," the first seme is immaterial. Here, however, a bridge is made through the crossed-out part of a polysemic structure.



Figure 3

A similar connection through a polysemic word appears in Rilke's "Pont du Carrousel":

> **Der blinde Mann, der auf der Brücke steht,**
> **grau wie ein Markstein namenloser Reiche,**
> **[The blind man, standing on the bridge,**
> **gray as a milestone marking nameless domains]**[9]

The word, "gray," when used for a person means "gray-haired, old," and perhaps also "colorless, disconsolate, abandoned"; whereas the grayness of the stone is a direct description of color (and, at the same time, of colorless vacuity, Figure 4). Since the link is established, however, further features are transferred from the secondary image (fr_2) to the blind man (fr_1). For the sake of simile, "gray as a stone" would be enough; the additional words provide ***redundant*** semantic material, they present an *fr* ("nameless domains") with no existential status in the IFR of the poem and hence require a ***metaphorical transfer***. Thus the blind man is not merely gray, but lonely as a stone, and he is like a milestone lost in vast nameless spaces, perhaps (by metonymy) nameless and anonymous himself.



Figure 4

Now, when we read the whole poem, the relationship is reversed; we have to reunderstand the metaphor. The blind man becomes the significant, permanent center of an ever-moving, faceless (to him), shallow race. The stone, rather than being gray and lost in space, becomes its point of orientation.

> **Der blinde Mann, der auf der Brücke steht,**
> **grau wie ein Markstein namenloser Reiche,**
> **er ist vielleicht das Ding, das immer gleiche,**
> **um das von fern die Sternenstunde geht,**
> **und der Gestirne stiller Mittelpunkt.**
> **Denn alles um ihn irrt und rinnt und prunkt.**
>
> **Er ist der unbewegliche Gerechte,**
> **in viele wirre Wege hingestellt;**
> **der dunkle Eingang in die Unterwelt**
> **bei einem oberflächlichen Geschlechte.**
> **(Rilke I:393)**
>
> **[The blind man standing on the bridge**
> **gray as a milestone of nameless domains,**
> **he is perhaps the thing, the ever steady thing**
> **around which, from afar, the lucky star turns,**
> **the still center of the galaxies.**
> **For everything around him wanders and flows and shines.**
>
> **He is the unmoving Just one,**
> **set on many wayward paths;**
> **the dark entrance to the Underworld**
> **for a shallow race.]**

In this poem, too, the compared term (fr_2) was completed in the second line; but the basic term (fr_1) – the blind man on the bridge – is unfolded through the whole poem and endowed with additional metaphors, which eventually reverse the meanings attributed to the blind man. The word, "Markstein," meaning simply "milestone" is etymologized (as so often in Rilke), the function of "marking" becomes prominent. His blindness underscores the faceless anonymity of the passers-by (contrasted, paradoxically, by the *named* bridge: Pont du Carrousel). The grayness of the simile is exposed as a mere linking excuse for a rich metaphorical operation.

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[9] The literal translations here and below are mine, intended to be a rendition as close to

Thus, a metaphoric relationship is given in the very opening of the poem; its understanding, however, changes radically as the text unfolds. The first term of the metaphor encompasses the whole poem; whereas the second term, though isolated in one clause, changes its meaning as we read on, due to the interaction with the dynamic first term.

Furthermore, the additional metaphorical images, revealing a parallel structure to fr_2, reinforce this change of concretization and create a transformation in both parts of the relationship. Schematically, the chain may be represented as follows:

fr_1 : blind man	bridge
fr_2 : gray markingstone	nameless domains
fr_3 : ever steady thing	lucky star turning
fr_4 : silent center	galaxies
fr_5 : unmoving Just one	wayward paths
fr_6 : dark entrance to Hades	shallow race

8

Much more complex are poems building up the secondary *fr* as a discontinuous pattern throughout a part of the poem. A rather simple example may be seen in another part of T. S. Eliot's "Prufrock":

> The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window-panes,
> The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes,
> Licked its tongue into the corners of the evening,
> Lingered upon the pools that stand in drains,
> Let fall upon its back the soot that falls from chimneys,
> Slipped by the terrace, made a sudden leap,
> And seeing that it was a soft October night,
> Curled once about the house, and fell asleep.
> ("The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock")

As in the Auden poem ("Macao"), a formal analysis would find in every line a separate metaphor. It is clear, however, that all secondary terms of these metaphors join in building up one *fr*. T. S. Eliot himself emphasizes the near-identity of the first two lines through their anaphoric and parallel structure ("fog" and "smoke" are synonymous in the London context, hence "back" and "muzzle" fulfill a synonymous function). In the first lines, one could, perhaps, argue that there is a mere metaphorical usage of certain words. But a fog can hardly have the form of a muzzle; this is the untransferable detail of a more generalized comparison, fog = animal, with the rubbing of a muzzle underlining the wet proximity of the fog. If a "back" may still be a mere metaphorical transfer of one word, rubbing its back is certainly an action of an animal, even though the



Figure 5

animal was not named (here, it could still be a pig). Through the use of the text-continuum (the dynamic principle), more and more animal features are amassed, until the unspecified animal becomes a cat.

And here a typical transformation occurs. At first the fr_2 = animal served merely as a store of metaphors for fr_1 = fog. Metaphors or metaphorical transfers may use all features and connotations of a secondary *fr* except for one: the property of its existence. While the animal is a metaphor, it does not exist as animal in the IFR of the poem. Toward the end, however, the fog *becomes* a cat (a humanized creature at that) and the cat as such appears on the scene, becomes real, entirely disregarding the realistic possibilities of a fog. Thus an image (animal), once presented to the reader's consciousness (not even in words, but through gap-filling of a metaphor), becomes "real," enters the fictional world of the text. The Russian Formalists called this phenomenon "realization of metaphor." It may, however, appear in a great variety of forms, not only as metaphor. Graphically, we may represent this strophe as is done in Figure 5.

The animal descriptions are continuous with each other, the leaping cat is a logical extension of fr_2. The clash (and its functions: irony, absurd, defiance of realism, etc. – depending on the poem) is due to an ontological shift. And it, in turn, is enabled by the fact that the metaphor is not presented in one point but rather as a pattern in which each element may relate to its counterpart in a different way.

The principle of metaphor requires two *frs* related like parallel lines that never meet; the two "realities" are not continuous with each other in the fictional world of the poem. In this poem, however, the parallel lines meet "irrationally," the two *frs* eventually collapse into one: the cat – a logical continuation of fr_2 – appears as such in fr_1, breaking the boundaries between "reality" and "imagination."

9

Placing metaphoric referents in the "real" world of poetic fiction is a central device of Modernist poetry. It may occur in the form of realized metaphors, realized similes, realized idioms, or what I suggest we call *"figurative events"* and *"figurative situations."* The two latter kinds are said to occur really in the world of the poem but are figurative in relation to a realistic norm.

A more striking example of this kind may be found in Rilke's "God in the Middle Ages":

Gott im Mittelalter

Und sie hatten Ihn in sich erspart
und sie wollten, dass er sei und richte
und sie hängten schließlich wie Gewichte
(zu verhindern seine Himmelfahrt)

an ihn ihrer grossen Kathedralen
Last und Masse. Und er sollte nur
über seine grenzenlosen Zahlen
zeigend kreisen und wie eine Uhr

Zeichen geben ihrem Tun und Tagwerk.
Aber plötzlich kam er ganz in Gang,
und die Leute der entsetzten Stadt

liessen ihn, vor seiner Stimme bang,
weitergehn mit ausgehängtem Schlagwerk
und entflohn vor seinem Zifferblatt.
(Rilke I:502)

[And they saved him up inside themselves
and they wanted him to be and to judge,
and finally they hung on him like weights
(to prevent his ascendance to heaven)

the burden and the massive body
of their big Cathedrals. He should merely
circle over his limitless numbers,
pointing and showing, and like a clock
mark their deeds and daily work.
But suddenly all of him moved, got going,
and the people of the flabbergasted city

left him, alarmed by his voice,
running on, the striking mechanism hanging out,
and fled from his (figure-)dial.]

A secondary image of a clock (fr_2) is constructed throughout tl poem. It appears explicitly at first in line 8 as a simile. On secor reading, however, we can detect its earlier elements.

"Gewichte" (line 3) are weights, they indicate: a) the heaviness the massive cathedrals and b) the weight with which the people wa to keep God down to earth; they may also connote c) the "weigh set on the scales of justice, thus joining the pattern of measurement and right judgment, enhanced by the rhyme, "richte" – "Gewichte." "Gewichte" in plural, however, may also mean d) "weights," especially of a big hanging clock. Thus, one word, when combined with other words in the text, creates four different patterns, activating four different meanings. We may schematically represent it as follows (in English):

a) weights + burden and massive body of cathedrals = heaviness
b) weights of cathedrals + preventing God's ascendance to heaven = earthbound
c) weights + to judge + pointing and showing + mark their daily work = judgment and regulation
d) weights + numbers + clock + striking mechanism + dial = clock

The last sense of the word, "weights of a clock," must be excluded in the context of the first strophe, but is revived by the pattern of the clock. Thus a "dead" connotation, first crossed out, lives on in the poem as a dead connotation and is revived in the sequel (Figure 6).

In the second strophe, circling over his (limitless) numbers indicates an enormous dial; "Zahlen" (numbers) is patterned with its synonym, "Ziffer," in line 14 (in the word "Zifferblatt," dial). The word "zeigend" (pointing) evokes the cognate, "Zeiger," – both "pointer" and "hand of a clock." In its immediate context, this is at most a dormant connotation reviewed, however, in the sequel. Indeed, the continuation of the sentence (lines 8–9) explains the pointing as giving signs "like a clock." Thus, when we reach the imile, we already have several referents of the *fr* "clock": weights, ands, numbers, circling, pointing.

Now the clock, introduced at first through crossed-out connotaions of words, then through a simile – and as such, non-existent in he fictional world of the poem – becomes real, an object in the fictional world. When additional aspects are revealed – the mechanism



Figure 6

hanging out and striking, the figure-dial – they are perfectly logical as an unfolding of the fr_2 = clock; they clash, however, with the basic reality. The enormous clock (with cathedrals as pendulae – now the crossed-out connotation [a] is revived), built up for the rational ordering of life, reveals its irrational impact to the people of the Middle Ages. Furthermore, it is God himself who became such a clock, underlined by the Gender-change from the feminine clock (eine Uhr) to the masculine pronouns: *he* became all movement, *his* voice, etc.

The effect of this image is achieved again through building up a secondary, metaphorical pattern and then landing it in the primary *fr*; i.e., suspending the conditional existence of metaphor, collapsing the mere image with the real. This is even further complicated by the introduction of this realized simile (God = clock) into the medieval city (fr_3) from which God was observed, creating the terrifying figurative event. We may summarize this patterning in Figure 7.



Figure 7

fr_1 – the medieval conception of God; fr_2 – clock; fr_3 – medieval city

line 3: *Gewichte* – crossed-out connotation
line 7: *Zahlen* – "numbers" – possible referent of fr_2 (r′)
line 8: *kreisen* – "to circle" – function of fr_2 (r″)
line 8: *zeigend* – cognate of referent ("Zeiger" – hand of clock") (r‴)
line 8: *wie eine Uhr* – simile
lines 10–14: direct descriptions (action, sound, mechanism, dial)

As we see, not all relations between the two patterns are metaphors. In the first four instances, we have *shared referents*: words that may belong to each of the two *frs* (often, through different semes of the same polysemic root). The fifth instance is a simile. The realization of the simile (in lines 10–14) is accomplished by collapsing its two terms, $fr_1 = fr_2$, and then by making it a direct referent within fr_3, the city. The imaginary clock has landed in the real world. We may call it a *figurative event*, being figurative in comparison with a realistic norm. It created a striking effect, both for the medieval builders of the clock-image and for the modern reader. We may say that, instead of using logical argument to prove his thesis about the irrational and terrifying, looming behind the ordered world of medieval religious belief, Rilke used the irrational logic of metaphor to make his point.

Are we still dealing with metaphor? Yes, since the image of the clock is metaphorical to those spiritual aspects of the medieval attitude to God and the order of the universe as conceived in the poem. It is a typical metaphorical relationship based not on a transfer of meaning in one word but on an interaction between two (or more) patterns, taking on various forms in the various linking points. Furthermore, the image is not a discrete static unit; various possible aspects of the metaphorical relationship are activated throughout the poem, shifting and even undermining the relation established in the beginning. This is enhanced by a change of point of view: in the eyes of the medieval people, God is like a clock in the sense of giving order to their lives; from an external point of view, however, he turns the tables on them.

Thus the metaphor uses – and exemplifies – the *dynamic aspect* of an unfolding poetic text. In addition, the pattern of the clock shifts from being merely hinted in subtle connotations of words to becoming a central *object* in the World of the poem, thus contradicting Ingarden's separation of levels in the literary text.

10

Rilke makes extensive use of such realizations of figures, figurative situations, and figurative events, accomplishing transitions from rhetorical figures and verbal forms to the fictional world of the poem. In other words, for him, words and their meanings, once introduced in a text (literally or through a simile or a figure), may become "existents," beings in a fictional world, concrete objects in space. This tendency is especially strong in "Neue Gedichte" and in abbreviated, often cryptical form in his later poetry.

Rilke's poetics of shifting from language to world is much wider than the phenomenon of metaphor. A key device is the normalization of adjectives and verbs and the subsequent *spatialization*, enabling figurative events to take place within the space of such concepts. E.g., writing about mirrors: "Und der Lüster geht wie ein Sechzehn-Ender / durch eure *Unbetretbarkeit*" ("and the chandelier goes like a polygon through your *impenetrability*," *Sonnets to Orpheus*, part 2, III. Rilke [1955:752]), where impenetrability itself becomes a penetrable space.

The transition from such spatialization of concepts to the creation of Rilke's mythopoetic space and its imaginary objects is natural. The poem "Der Einsame" ("The Lonely Man") opens thus:

Nein: ein Turm soll sein aus meinem Herzen
und ich selbst an seinen Rand gestellt:
wo sonst nichts mehr ist, noch einmal Schmerzen
und Unsäglichkeit, noch einmal Welt.
(Rilke I:636)

[No, my heart should be a tower
and I myself set on its ledge:
where nothing more exists, not even pain
and the unsayable, not even world.]
(italics mine – B.H.)

The "heart," a metonymy for the psyche, becomes a concrete object in space, separated from its owner; and it is a paradoxical space, where emotions and the world itself are banned. As all Rilke readers know, the heart, music, decay, etc. receive spatial dimensions (the famous "Weltinnenraum," the internal space as an externalized world), which can then be furnished, provided with some concrete details, moved by figurative events.[10]

I shall not discuss the range of Rilke's poetics here. I would merely like to place in this perspective another, rather straightforward example of a dynamic use of realization.

Spanische Tänzerin

Wie in der Hand ein Schwefelzündholz, weiß,
eh es zur Flamme kommt, nach allen Seiten
zuckende Zungen streckt —: beginnt im Kreis
naher Beschauer hastig, hell und heiß
ihr runder Tanz sich zuckend auszubreiten.

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[10] A striking example is provided in the first of Rilke's *Sonnets to Orpheus*, which starts with the literal statement: "Da stieg ein Baum" ("A tree grew here"). The tree turns out to be "a high tree in the ear," a complex metaphor for the growth of internal music. Thus, the BASE is turned into a secondary *fr*. But as soon as an *fr* of a tree is introduced, unexpected extensions are developed: a whole forest with "animals of silence," for which Orpheus eventually creates a "temple inside hearing" ("Tempel im Gehör"). The autonomous unfolding of the "tree" *fr* is similar to Mayakovsky's fire below, though with a mythopoeic rather than a grotesque function.

Und plötzlich ist er Flamme, ganz und gar.

Mit einem Blick entzündet sie ihr Haar
und dreht auf einmal mit gewagter Kunst
ihr ganzes Kleid in diese Feuersbrunst,
aus welcher sich, wie Schlangen die erschrecken,
die nackten Arme wach und klappernd strecken.

Und dann: als würde ihr das Feuer knapp,
nimmt sie es ganz zusamm und wirft es ab
sehr herrisch, mit hochmütiger Gebärde
und schaut: da liegt es rasend auf der Erde
und flammt noch immer und ergiebt sich nicht —.

Doch sieghaft, sicher und mit einem süßen
grüßenden Lächeln hebt sie ihr Gesicht
und stampft es aus mit kleinen festen Füßen.
(Rilke I:531)

[*The Spanish Dancer*

Like a match in her hand, white
before it leaps into flame, in all directions
stretching flickering tongues — so begins, in the narrow
circle of spectators, bright and hot,
her round dance, widens flickering.

And suddenly it is all flame.

With one glance, she ignites her hair
and in her daring art, turns all-at-once
her whole dress into this blazing fire,
from which, like frightened serpents,
her naked arms, alert and clattering, stretch out.

And then: as if the fire were tight on her,
she gathers it up and hurls it away
imperiously, with an arrogant gesture
and looks: here it lies raging on the ground
still flaming, still unyielding.

But triumphantly, confident, with a sweet
welcoming smile, she lifts her face
and stamps it out with tiny firm feet.]

The fire image is introduced at first within a simile. Even within the simile, it is a mere extension of a potential "fire" *fr*: a match, still without fire, white (by metonymy: like her hand holding it). Within the simile, however, connotations of the words contribute to building up the fire semantics: 1) through a vivid, concrete description of what it is not yet, of a potential flame (lines 2–3); 2) through an etymological morpheme within the German word for "matches" in line 1 ("zünd-" = ignite); 3) through the repetition of "zuckend" (which may be flickering as well as jerky, twitching); and 4) through a nervous series of flickering, onomatopoeic alliterations (zünd – zuckende – Zungen – zuckend; Hand – holz – hastig – hell – heiß).

Suddenly, the simile turns into an existent: what was *like* a match that may produce fire becomes real fire. The two *fr*s collapse: the dance *is* a fire, the dancer goes up in the flames. And then, again, the dancer separates the fire from her body, as well as from her dance – and stomps out the fire. Schematically:

1. The dance is *like* (a match before becoming) fire
2. The dance *is* fire
3. The dance is not fire, but the fire exists independently
4. The dance extinguishes the fire

11

A more sophisticated use of a realized fire imagery appears in a fragment of Mayakovsky's long poem, "A Cloud in Trousers." (Though built on a tragic-heroic conception of love and language and the individual's fate in history, it may have grotesque overtones in the eyes of a contemporary reader. The literal translation does not convey Mayakovsky's powerful rhythm, oratorical tone, and inventive rhyme-effects, but may serve our purpose here.)

Hello!
Who is it?
Mamma?
Mamma!
Your son is splendidly ill!
Mamma!
His heart caught fire.
Tell his sisters, Lyuda and Olya,–
he has no place to hide.
Every word,
even a joke,
which he spews from his scorching mouth,
leaps like a naked whore
out of a burning brothel.

People sniff –
a smell of roasting!
Some men are rushed in.
Shining!
In helmets!
Please, no boots!
Tell the firemen:
On a burning heart one climbs in caresses.
Let me.
My tear-filled eyes I'll roll out like barrels.

Let me lean on my ribs.
I'll jump out! I'll jump out! I'll jump out! I'll jump out!
They've collapsed.
You can't jump out of your own heart!

On a smoldering face,
from the crack of the lips,
a wee cinder kiss rises to spring.

Mamma!
I cannot sing.
In the heart's chapel, the choir loft catches fire!

Scorched figures of words and numbers
from the skull,
like children from a burning building.
Thus fear,
catching at the sky,
lifted
the burning arms of the *Lusitania*.

To people trembling
in apartment's calm
a hundred-eyed blaze bursts from the docks.
My last scream –
at least you
wail into the centuries:
I'm on fire!

The fragment opens with the Russian word, "pozhar," meaning specifically a fire of burning houses or of a city. The poet is ill: he has "fire of the heart" (more correctly: "buildings' fire"). This is obviously a fresh way of using the conventional stock metaphor, "burning love" or "fire of love," through a realization of the semi-dead metaphor of fire. Furthermore, the syntactic form of "his heart caught fire" (literally: "he has fire of the heart") is parallel to expressions for heart diseases, thus the metaphor of fire is crossed with another stock image: love as an illness of the heart. By shifting, however, from the trite (and dead) metaphor, "burning love," to a burning house, a fresh, individualized *fr* is opened up, which may be carried in several directions. A fire in a city brings a noisy brigade of firemen; they, in turn, have bright helmets and dirty boots, they climb upon ladders on the burning building; scorched figures jump out of the flaming house, etc. All these have nothing to do with intensional properties of the concept, "fire," or with the general object, fire, and its connotations; they are rather extensions of a specific description, as chosen and unfolded by the author.

Further branching out occurs when this image is crossed with other Mayakovskian images: additional *fr*s are drawn in, the full understanding of which requires further knowledge about them, provided in Mayakovsky's poems and Futurist manifestoes. The bourgeois language is trite, words are worn out like prostitutes, a poet is a source of words, a master of the naked word – hence his heart is a burning brothel. On the other hand, his words are like children in fear trying to grasp at something high, and this evokes the image of useless grasping at the sky by the burning and drowning ship *Lusitania*. And, finally, the poet on fire creates a dawn-like torch, blazing into the centuries (alluding to Mayakovsky's prophetic or Christ-like self-image.)

In this case, the secondary *fr* is coherent and consistently developed, while the basic *fr* rambles from one aspect to another: we can imagine the fire developing to its end, but not quite a consistent equivalent of a series of moves in the emotional domain. On the other hand, the individual transfers between the two basic *frs* are enhanced and branched out into a number of additional *frs* representing the poet's aesthetics and ideology. In the basic *fr*, love story, autonomous sub-scenes are created, not necessarily concatenated in a logical or narrative structure (except for the logic of the realized *fr* of "fire"), representing the autonomous "bricks" of rhymed language which Mayakovsky has later described in his essay, "How to Make Verse."

The Modernist poetic impact – absurd, tragic, or grotesque – occurs when events of fr_2 ("fire") are said to take place in fr_1 and have specific effects there. Normally, in the metaphor, "my heart is on fire," one may transfer any property or connotation of fire to the "heart" (which is a metonymy for the domain of feelings and emotions), except for one, the existence property: the heart is not really burning. In a realization of the metaphor, it is precisely this property which is transferred: the real heart of flesh and blood (rather than its metonymic domain) is burning. Mayakovsky foregrounds it through a further extension: if a real heart really burns, there must be a smell of burning flesh and people in the street sniff it. Thus Mayakovsky confronts the reader with the results of a collapse of the two disjointed *frs*; he asserts the consistency of metaphoric poetic language over any coherence or plausibility of representation.

In a similar way, a person climbing out of a burning house must lean on some remaining beams; in a chest those are his ribs – but then Mayakovsky hits the reader with the truth on the BASE level: you cannot leap out of your own heart! Unlike Eliot's cat or Rilke's "Spanish Dancer," Mayakovsky makes the reader realize the consequences of such a realization of metaphor. Perhaps a fog cannot be reduced to the form of a cat, but a cat can be accommodated in the corner of a house. Rilke's dance *becomes* a real fire, but still the dancer does not actually burn, we do not smell her flesh. The Futurist Mayakovsky provokes by challenging this existential separation, by foregrounding the absurd. However, even with him, the unrealistic clashes are merely individual figurative events, they do not involve the totality of fr_1: The poet still lives, screams, writes.

In other words, *some* predications of existence of referents in fr_2 obtain – counterrealistically – in fr_1, but the merger is not complete. E.g., the heart burns, but not the whole body. The unrealistic events do not create rules for a new, possible reality. Hence, the strange events remain figurative rather than tragic.

We can describe this phenomenon in another way: the fire is not metaphorical but literal; it *exists* in the basic reality of the poem. When a chain of metaphors is repeated throughout a text, the metaphorical function (the m-sign) can be taken out of the brackets: if "e" is an event, and "me" a metaphorical event, then:

$$me_1 + me_2 + me_3 \longrightarrow m\,(e_1 + e_2 + e_3)$$

That is, the events are real, but they occur in a reality (a "possible world") which is itself metaphorical, "unrealistic," contradicting our sense of what is possible in a real world. Thus, metaphoricity, once introduced as a relation between frames of reference within the Internal Field of Reference, now turns into a relation between the IFR and an External Field of Reference, the real world. Metaphoricity is transferred from the *language* of the poem to its fictional *reality-key*. The vividness of this new clash is underlined by the fact that the hero of the poem is Mayakovsky himself addressing his real-life mother and sisters, Lyuda and Olya, i.e., referents shared by both the IFR and the ExFR (Figure 8).



Figure 8

12

The ontological status of a secondary *fr* in the Internal Field of Reference of a poem is not always unambiguous or clear. Here is a poem by Robert Creeley:

A Wicker Basket

Comes the time when it's later
and onto your table the headwaiter
puts the bill, and very soon after
rings out the sound of lively laughter –

Picking up change, hands like a walrus,
and a face like a barndoor's,
and a head without any apparent size,
nothing but two eyes –

So that's you, man,
or me. I make it as I can,
I pick up, I go
faster than they know –

Out the door, the street like a night,
any night, and not one in sight,
but then, well, there she is,
old friend Liz –

And she opens the door of her cadillac,
I step in back,
and we're-gone.
She turns me on –

There are very huge stars, man, in the sky,
and from somewhere very far off someone hands me a
    slice of apple pie,
with a gob of white, white ice cream on top of it,
and I eat it –

Slowly. And while certainly
they are laughing at me, and all around is racket
of these cats not making it, I make it
in my wicker basket.

This poem, interesting in its use of the spoken language, was said to be the first American poem on the experience of using marijuana. I shall not analyze it in detail, but merely observe one simile: "the street like a night." Is the street only "like" a night in that it is dark and empty, stressing his isolation or abandonment by those "cats" laughing at him? Or is it actually night, and we must disregard the simile marker, "like"? After all, he left the café when the time came and it was "later." Such questions cannot possibly be decided in an interpretation based on the given text. But it does not really matter. Whether the *fr*, "night," is continuous or merely metaphorical with the basic *fr* of the poem, the transferred meanings are similar in both cases.

Furthermore, the night is unfolded and used in several ways in the sequel. The idiom, "pie in the sky," is realized: he sees huge stars in the sky and actually gets apple pie with ice cream, representing the sweetness of "grass" and perhaps suggesting erotic imagery ("I make it"). Whether he was really treated to the sweet things or not, they work as metaphors. He is on a high; he sees stars – real or metaphorical: the effect is the same. In one case, they serve as metonymies: the scene includes a night and huge stars, then the night is separated from the street by an observer, juxtaposed to it as an independent *fr* and opened up for metaphorical transfers. In the other case, they are figments of his imagination or straightforward metaphors of substitution.

In short, whether it is *like* a night or it *is* a night is undecided in the text; in either case a number of referents from the *fr*, "night," are transferred to the speaker's mood, via idioms, metaphors, or rhymes. This undecided ontological state is justified by the presentation of all information through the speaker's point of view and colorful language.

The same holds for the "wicker basket": it may represent a baby's cradle, Liz's car, or allude to baby Moses in the Bible; its connotations and emotional impact are clear though its reference to the fictional world is blurred.

13

In Ezra Pound's famous "In a Station of the Metro," there is neither a formal metaphor nor an overt simile. Two *frs* are simply placed next to each other:

The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough.

We could read the poem without integrating the two lines, as if with the instructions:

Think: "The apparition of these faces. . ."
and think: "Petals. . ."

The wish (and convention) for integration of a text, however, forces us to turn one of the lines into a metaphor, in order to project it upon the other *fr*. The title decides which is the basic *fr*; it could easily be the opposite: a poem about petals like faces.

Note that here, too, fr_1 has intruded into the language of fr_2: the bough is *black* and wet like a station after a rain.

The famous "thinginess" of the imagists, the Chinese-inspired idiogram, turns out to be quite metaphorical. As Pound himself observed, "The one-image poem is a form of super-position, that is to say, it is one idea set on top of another."

This technique of simply juxtaposing discontinuous *frs* (even conjoined in one sentence) and forcing metaphorical transfers on the reader is beautifully employed by Osip Mandelshtam:

Sisters – heaviness and tenderness – your signs are the same.
Bees and wasps suck a heavy rose.
A man dies, warmed sand cools
And yesterday's sun is carried off on a black stretcher.

Oh, heavy honeycombs and tender nets,
It is easier to lift a stone than to repeat your name!
I have one concern left in the world,
A golden goal, to get rid of the burden of time.

Like dark water I drink the muddied air.
Time has been plowed up, and the rose was earth.
In a slow whirlpool heavy tender roses,
Roses Heaviness and Tenderness she wove into double wreathes!

Mandelshtam was a Russian "Acmeist" poet. The Acmeists, like the English Imagists, extolled poetry that presents the thing itself, "names" objects, calls a spade a spade, or, as Mandelshtam put it, discovers the identity of A = A (as opposed to the metaphorical principle of the Futurists, A = B). Indeed, many clauses in the poem are direct descriptions (though sometimes using metaphors to support the description). Mandelshtam, however, transfers the Futurist metaphoric principle from the level of poetic language to the level of composition: the separate descriptions open up many disconnected *frs*. In order to integrate "a man dies" and "warmed sand cools," we must link them metonymically or metaphorically or both: they are not connected syntactically or logically in the text. Either the sand cooled because a man lying there died or because the sun has set (a third independent *fr*); either the sunset is a metaphor of the dying man or the opposite; or they are all metonymic to each other, parts of the same surreal landscape. The same holds for "Sisters – heaviness and tenderness" in relation to "bees and wasps": is the first the basic *fr*, exemplified by the second, or vice versa?

And what is the poem "about," what is its basic situation, the basic *fr*? Is it about "heaviness and tenderness," represented in bees and wasps, or vice versa? Is it about the sweet and stinging principles of death and love and time? Or are the earlier *frs* later turned into metaphors for a poem about a man's death or about suicide (Ophelia?) or a poem about love (for which all the preceding *frs* represent the heightened emotions)?

As the reader advances, he is repeatedly invited to perform transformations of the *fr* base. Possibly, all of the hierarchical relationships between the different, disconnected *frs* (and "themes" of the poem) are reversible. In any case, metaphorical relations between the segments must be constructed in order to project the disparate *frs* upon the assumed basic situation and make sense of this symphonic poem. Another alternative would leave the segments side by side, suggestively unconnected, as a surrealist dream; but even then they must all be projected on a basic *fr*, outside the words of the poem, representing the speaker's "mood." After all, it is only from the position of an associative speaker that such a series of images can be sustained in one short frame.

14

A somewhat different use of interacting *frs* can be seen in the poem of the Israeli poet, Yehuda Amichai:

My Parents' Migration

And my parents' migration has not yet calmed in me.
My blood goes on shaking at the walls,
As the bowl after it is set down.
And my parents' migration has not yet calmed in me.
Winds continually over stones.
Earth forgets the footsteps of those who walk.
An awful fate. Stumps of talk after midnight.
An achievement, a retreat. Night reminds
And day forgets.
My eyes, which have looked a long time into a vast desert,
Are a little calmed. One woman. The rules of a game
Nobody had ever completely explained. The laws of pain and weight.

Even now my heart
Makes only a bare living

With its daily love.
My parents in their migration.
On the crossroads where I am forever orphaned.
Too young to die, too old to play.
The weariness of the miner
The emptiness of the quarry
In one body.
Archaeology of the future,
Museums of what is still to happen.
And my parents' migration has not yet calmed in me.

And from bitter peoples I learned bitter languages
For my silence among the houses

Which are always
Like ships.

Already my veins, my tendons
Are a tangle of ropes I will never undo.
Finally, my own death
And an end to my parents' migration.

(translation by Assia Gutman)

His mode is direct statement, which often may be taken as a literal sentence – as if he were furnishing the described world – but has to be integrated metaphorically in the basic *fr*. "The rules of a game nobody had ever completely explained" has nothing metaphorical but must be projected upon the poet's life and necessarily metaphorized.

Of special interest is the *internalized frame*: the images of the parents' migration (fr_2), presumably by sea, are internalized in the poet's self (fr_1). Hence, "has not yet calmed in me" is revived into an image of water "shaking at its walls," reconstructed as a *ship* that has not calmed, with his own veins as a tangle of ropes. All other *frs* (mostly descriptions) are projected upon this *fr* of migration (e.g., "winds continually over stones") which is, in turn, internalized in the poet, i.e., becomes a metaphor for his being.

15

We used examples from Modernist poetry to make a clear case for metaphors that result from the interaction of semantic patterns unfolded in a text, therefore multirelated, changing, and employing constructed *frs* rather than mere denotations and connotations of words. The same principles are used profusely in journalism as well as in narrative fiction.

Here is a passsage from an editorial in *The New York Times* (1977):

> *The Right Price of Energy*
>
> For all its length, tables, omissions, exhortations and numbing complexity, the Carter administration's energy program proclaimed a single message: the price is wrong.
>
> Americans are *energy alcoholics*. For half a century, they have *reveled* on cheap oil, gas and electricity. Not content with one car, they have bought two and three. Not content with toasters, they have generated a whole sub-industry to tantalize them with electric carving knives, crepe pans, cookie shooters. Natural gas is a premium home-heating fuel in limited supply; they use it to heat commercial boilers that could readily employ coal instead. But energy is worth more than Americans pay for it – and is rapidly becoming dearer still. If the *revel* continues, *the morning after* will be long and painful, indeed.

(italics mine)

The specific meanings of "revel" in the last sentence and "the morning after" are clearly not isolated metaphors, but depend on a pattern established in line 4: fr_2, "alcoholics," as a metaphor for "energy users." The "morning after" is an unexpected twist similar to the behavior of Rilke's clock, resuming an *fr* established twelve lines earlier.

16

Russell Baker is a master of such metaphorical interactions of *frs*. Here is an opening of an article in *The New York Times* of March 23, 1983:

> *War and Sweets*
> by Russell Baker
>
> Disclosure that the Russian army is already equipped with an accurate pie-delivery system is no surprise to those of us in the military-pastry complex.
>
> Two years ago we warned President Reagan that advances in pie-throwing technology already made it possible to hurl a lemon meringue pie with such accuracy that it could hit an enemy in the face at a distance of two miles from the launching site.

This metaphorical relationship is developed throughout the whole article, employing a series of unexpected extensions and allusions: to the military-industrial complex, "a *slice* of the defense budget," slapstick films ("a soldier struck in the face by a lemon meringue pie becomes so angry and embarrassed by his comrades' laughter that he becomes incapable of functioning," as the psychologists found out), and even "a cake just like mother used to make." It is not an allegory with an independent story about a pie, but rather tapping the semantic resources of two parallel *frs*.

17

In this paper, I have discussed primarily metaphors of the "extended" type. It would require another study to show the operations of other parameters – syntactic, lexical, etc. – within these examples.

The question is to what extent the same approach may work for metaphors with a brief, one-word focus. Without prejudging such a study, I would remark that here, too, an element of a foreign *fr* is projected on a BASE; the secondary *fr*, however, is often not individualized, its features are even less detailed than in the above examples, requiring even stronger activation of gaps from the BASE. (In many cases, though, we have conventionalized connotations, as in "*burning* love," or elements of idiomatic expressions.)

Another point worth stressing is that the "existence" of the secondary *fr* does not necessarily have to be negated by the BASE.

It is sufficient that within one *fr*, two sub-*frs* are isolated, as is often the case in nature poetry: a person is presented as part of a nature scene, but his psyche is also perceived as separate from the nature description; thus we have a metonymic relationship between the two and metaphorical transfers are encouraged: his mood is like aspects of nature and nature is perceived in human terms.

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